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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, operations security (OPSEC) assumed greater importance in planning and executing military operations. America was at war with an elusive enemy -terrorism. While Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri stood as al Qaeda's front men, the faceless terrorist cells were tactical threats to U.S. forces both at home station and deployed. When the U.S. military launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), it reserved discussing the full spectrum of its operations. Media coverage was further limited in that journalists initially lacked access to the battlefield and those forces fighting the war. There were several reasons for this. First, because of host nation sensitivities, some countries were unwilling or unable to expend political capital by openly showing support for OEF. The sheer distance between air bases or ships and their targets in Afghanistan further hindered coverage. Primarily though, OEF's opening stages were conducted by special operations forces. The Pentagon leadership's going-in premise was that the Global War on Terror was an unconventional war and the media would not enjoy a desired amount of access to the fight. Press coverage of special operations activities could jeopardize safety and lives. Putting it bluntly, Victoria Clarke, thenAssistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said, "There would be some things that nobody could or should see." 1 As conventional forces entered combat, media access to U.S. forces
increased. There were some missteps such as the quarantining of a media pool to prevent coverage of casualties from a B-52 friendly fire incident. However, the commander who had "boots on the ground" made this decision locally, not pressure from leadership back in Washington, D.C. 2 When the United States turned its attention to Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD)
had a better opportunity to engage the press. The character of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was largely different from OEF. Whereas special operations forces comprised the initial main effort in Afghanistan, conventional forces would have that role in OIF. In developing OIF's media plan, the DOD and U.S. Central Command could "weaponize" reporters to counter enemy propaganda while also telling the military's story. With the intent of providing unfettered access to embedded reporters, the commanders were understandably concerned over "the potential for the inadvertent release of classified or sensitive information by embeds -information that would compromise a mission or affect the safety of military personnel." 3 Likewise, media were concerned about how much access they would actually have once combat operations began. 4 Secretary of Defense-issued Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) spelled out ground rules for the commanders, Public Affairs Officers (PAOs), and the 700 embedded reporters. The extensive set of ground rules established categories of releasable information, coverage of casualties, use of satellite phones and much more. The PAG was only a starting point.
Depending upon the relationship developed between the unit commander and embedded reporter, journalists were privy to classified information which afforded them greater context and background for the operation they were covering. Such acts were not historically unprecedented.
In an October 1996 speech at the Air War College, Joe Galloway said:
There was precisely one reporter who went to war with a personal recommendation from General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in his hip pocket, and you're looking at him. Thanks to that trust, I was sent down to the 24th Mech two weeks before G-day. 
Operations Security Challenges
There is extensive research on the tenuous relationship between the military and the media. While both have missions to serve the public, the manner in which each achieves its objectives is at odds with the other. To provide for the protection and defense of the United 
Tell Your Story
Although there would appear to be a tendency for service members to avoid talking with the press in the name of OPSEC, the media actually can be a conduit to reach the American public, allies, and adversaries. Engaging the media helps the military gain and maintain public support. Media engagement can also be a global deterrent. Reports of soldiers preparing to deploy, aircraft weapons loading, and warships heading out to sea show U.S. resolve. "As with the recent 'shock and awe' campaign accompanying the opening of the war in Iraq, coverage that demonstrates the performance and professionalism of the U.S. military to citizens at home also demonstrates those intimidating qualities to the enemy." 13 It is at this point, where one can see a convergence between the military and media objectives. Through this symbiotic relationship, the military can use the media in an information operations (IO) capacity to build public support and deter the enemy. Meanwhile, the media fulfills its obligation to the American people by reporting on the military.
The DOD Principles of Information call for maximum disclosure of releasable information with minimal delay. This does not mean total disclosure with no delay.
Commanders must carefully balance OPSEC requirements with other IO needs during planning.
Victoria Clarke said, "[The DOD's] primary responsibility is to ensure the safety of our troops and the successes of their missions -a goal journalists have almost universally respected. In the process of fulfilling that duty, we have, arguably, erred frequently on the side of caution. And journalists have -rightly -pushed for more access to the war than the department has thought it appropriate to give them." 14 For reporters to do their job properly, they must be able to gain access to the story. Therein lays the problem as media access opens the military to a spectrum of risk. At one end of the spectrum, media reporting generates coverage that supports a commander's IO objectives. At the other end, reporting could compromise OPSEC and cost lives and equipment. Commanders must find the appropriate balance for an issue where there are no fixed rules. 15 "If it comes down to absolutely an operational security versus press access issue, military people will put the mission first, but they very much think that maintaining public support through the intercession and reporting of the media is essential to the long-term success." 16 Such was the case for the U.S. military when it began OEF operations in Afghanistan.
OEF Media Access And Coverage
When OEF began, the military had an overwhelming need for OPSEC so that special operations forces could conduct missions against Taliban and al Qaeda militants. While press access to forces fighting in Afghanistan during the beginning of OEF was not feasible, the DOD accommodated reporters where it could. "On the first night of air strikes, 39 journalists from 26 news organizations were aboard U.S. Navy ships involved in the operation. Another 100 were on the flight line when C-17s returned from the first drops of humanitarian rations." 17 Reporters did not have direct access to those forces who had "boots on the ground" in Afghanistan during the beginning of OEF. Nevertheless, the DOD found a balance between OPSEC and media access and granted interviews up and down the chain of command where it could.
As conventional forces entered the combat zone, so did more reporters. Besides granting access to U.S. Navy ships, reporters flew along with E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System patrols and aboard aerial refueling tankers supporting combat air patrols. 18 
Embeds
The balance between OPSEC and media access for OIF heavily tilted towards access.
The media would play a wholly different role during this fight. Rather than simply covering the war from the rear, the press would have front row seats by embedding with the coalition units.
"Communications would be a top priority … not as a public relations imperative but as a military one." 20 Embedding would satiate the media's access to the forces fighting the war, but more importantly support the military's strategy:
Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. Our ultimate strategic success in bringing the peace and security to this region will come in our long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideals. We need to tell the factual story -good or bad -before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do. 21 Pentagon leadership considered IO vital for successful prosecution of the war. Besides highlighting the professionalism of the U.S. military and the precautions it exercises to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage, the media would serve as a factual counter to enemy propaganda. "Saddam was the mother of all liars. His propaganda machine -which would shape world opinion, especially the vaunted 'Arab street' -would affect our ability to hold the coalition together, especially strategically critical allies in the Middle East." 22 By having the press present throughout the operation across the operational area, they could separate fact from the Iraqi propaganda machine's fiction. Likewise, if there were instances of where coalition forces inadvertently killed innocent civilians, the media afforded a sense of transparency. 23 Again, the media would be present to report the truth. Not only allowing media access to combat forces, but actually embedding them, served the DOD's ultimate purpose of ensuring the American people knew about its military and its performance. "If there's one aspect of their government that they should care about, though, it's the military," Victoria Clarke said. "And we did everything possible to make their military accessible to them." 24 The DOD established an extensive set of ground rules for the media embeds to abide by in order to ensure OPSEC. Practicing security at the source is the basis for any media engagement. To safeguard coalition forces further, the ground rules instituted an embargo that banned live reporting from air base flightlines until the first strike aircraft returned from their missions. 25 Other restrictions prohibited discussing specific numbers of people, aircraft, vehicles, and ships in order to maintain operational and tactical surprise. Unfortunately, there were instances where the media violated the ground rules. Of the 700 media who embedded for OIF, only 26 involuntary disembedded for violating the agreedupon ground rules. 33 One reporter discussed future coalition operations while sketching a map on the ground during a broadcast. 34 Another continued using his Thuraya satellite phone after the military determined that the phone's Global Positioning System capability could compromise friendly troops locations and subsequently issued a directive to stop using them. 35 While these types of issues could have had consequences at the tactical level, they were not damaging at the operational and strategic levels.
OIF Media Access And Coverage
Of the 700 reporters participating in the embed program, 332 were with the Army, 210
were with the Marines, 110 were with the Navy, and 25 were with Special Forces. 36 Ground units absorbed the bulk of the media embeds because of the large number of operational units that were on hand to push into Iraq. Since the ground units had the preponderance of embeds, this obviously meant that the Army and Marines garnered the most press coverage. In accordance with the rationale behind the OIF media plan, it was of greater importance to have those reporters with ground forces, as they would be the ones in direct contact with the Iraqi population. Fortunately, factual reporting trumped Iraqi propaganda as predicted. For example, Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf's press conferences -lampooned as "Baghdad Bob" -became laughable as coalition forces moved into Baghdad.
The Air Force benefited considerably less than its sister services from embed reports during OIF's initial phases. Although the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) operated out of Kuwait City and ground units were staging in northern Kuwait for the push into Iraq, it was questionable as to whether or not the Kuwaitis would permit media access to its air bases.
Host nation approval was a sticking point for other air bases throughout the area of operations.
During initial planning, the Air Force had agreed to hosting 83 reporters. When host nation approval fell through, the number dropped to 24. Both embeds received an initial overview of the Predator squadron's mission and the unmanned aerial vehicle's capabilities. Other than conducting interviews with the squadron's commander, aircrew, and maintainers, embedding with the squadron was not a viable option.
The PAG stated upfront that the news media representatives were not to have access to classified information. 38 With that restriction in place, once a Predator was underway, it was on a classified mission. This issue ties back to the importance of the commanders and reporters building rapport. There were difficulties in trying to accomplish that with these two reporters.
Further, the squadron commander was media savvy. He supported numerous CPIC-sponsored media visits during the weeks between the Government of Kuwait allowing press access to its air bases and the beginning of OIF. The best option available to the reporters was to embed them in the multitude of 386 AEW support units on a two-week rotational basis. One reporter started with the services squadron, the other went to the civil engineer squadron. Neither reporter was pleased with the situation; especially after learning that the Marine's embeds were flying on assault missions. Rather, they pressed to "Go North." A critique of DOD's embed program has been that the reporters in the field were only getting a "soda straw" view of the war. 39 For the 386 AEW's embeds, this meant that their view would be limited to Air Force support operations, which did not entail forward deploying at the time.
In their frustration and attempts to get to Iraq, neither reporter generated worthwhile coverage of their assigned squadrons. In fact, the only notable Air Force coverage was of the Predator squadron when they first arrived. Second, by opening the media's eyes to these missions, one could hope additional coverage would follow. The reality is that most reporters went to Balad Air Base with the intent and focus on covering battlefield medicine. Some reporters were frustrated in that their limited time at
Balad Air Base went to activities that did not meet that purpose. While embedding reporters in deployed units is an obvious option for the Air Force now, so too is the opportunity to embed reporters in units remaining at home station. Certainly, this
would not be to the same extent and duration of embedding experienced during OIF. This is primarily because news media organizations could not commit a reporter to a narrow set of stories for an extended period. However, short duration embeds could work for both the media and the Air Force. In February 2003, the 314th Airlift Wing hosted a television anchor from the Little Rock ABC-affiliate to cover the base for 48 hours. This partnership was advantageous for both parties in that the media were preparing for sweeps week and the base was able to highlight 
Conclusion
One could describe the relationship between the military and the media as an ongoing tug o' war and OPSEC is in the middle. The military is "pulling" to protect its resources from prying enemies. In a post-9/11 world, the requirement for OPSEC is even greater. Meanwhile the media are "pulling" to disclose actions the military is taking. Rather working against each other, the solution is to find a balance between secrecy and openness. It is the responsibility of commanders to determine where the balance lays.
Depending on the nature of the operation, media access simply may not be feasible in order to protect the lives of those Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen fighting the nation's wars. OEF epitomizes such an instance where the need to preserve operational and tactical surprise outweighed the need for reporters to have access to the combat zone. While direct access was not feasible at the beginning of the operation, the military did not go "cold mic."
Rather, it engaged the media through other means including frequent interviews and briefings with senior DOD leadership, embarking media aboard Navy ships, and later pooling. 
